Abstract
The Political Economy of State Capture in Central Europe
The stable party competitions and Weberian states of post-war Western Europe were founded on strong elite commitments to democracy and socially embedded through sustained productivity growth and universally rising living standards. But those conditions have never existed in Central Europe (see Epstein, this volume) . Consequently their states are not consolidating as those of post-war Western Europe did nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future. What we are seeing instead, this paper argues, are serious problems of state capture not just in the usual suspects, Romania, Bulgaria and now Hungary but in the majority of the new member states.
The argument advanced here is that the region is peculiarly vulnerable to two modes of state capture: party state capture and corporate state capture. In the former parties repoliticise the state in pursuit of political monopoly. In the latter public power is exercised primarily for private gain, and private interests pay to subvert the legitimate channels of political influence (Hellman et al, 2010, pp. 2-3) . While it is plausible that both modes could operate together the evidence suggests two surprisingly clear clusters of Central European states around a dominant mode, with some relatively non-corrupted systems facing vivid attempts to re-monopolise the values and allegiance of the state (e.g. Hungary, Poland) and the more corrupted systems showing a clear and consistent prioritisation of the extraction of financial value (e.g. in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria). In the latter, attempts to penetrate the state are evidently aimed more at financial than political monopoly. Post-EU membership the only systematic attempt to roll back democracy has occurred where hitherto effective representation failed for political economic reasons: in Hungary.
The clustering of states seems to follow from distinct patterns of party competition; one established on the basis of public representation, the other on the basis of corporate competition between only nominally 'political' actors. Which pattern took root was determined by the level of initial elite commitment to democratic values and its sustainability was subject to political economic conditions. The early and deep institutionalisation of these modes and hence the clear clustering of cases was possible because of the near total character of institutional site-clearing and rebuilding that ensued in the post-communist transition.
Our order of business then is to establish where each of the new member states stand in this picture; to explore why much of the political science literature has tended to be overoptimistic about party-state development and democratic consolidation in the region; to unpack the mode of party competition thesis in more depth and to provide critical case studies: Poland and the Czech Republic. In conclusion the paper explores why, excepting in egregious violations of the separation of powers (see Sedelmeier, this volume), the current EU can do little to change these trends once they are established.
State capture in practice and theory
The World Bank Governance Indicator, 'control of corruption' (Kaufmann et al, 2010, p. (Darden, 2008) .
In other words it is quite possible to combine high corruption with high social order. Party is straightforwardly confounding of the institutionalist theory since party competition has remained strong.
When it came to understanding cases of deteriorating state performance Grzymała-Busse was clear in Leviathan that she wasn't trying to theorise institutional 'stickiness': thus if the robustness of competition changed she argued that this change would have immediate effects on state exploitation (Grzymała-Busse, 2007, p. 15, ftn. 39) . But though theoretically consistent this makes for a restricted theory of democratic state building insofar as consolidation remains mysterious. The implication of Leviathan is that institutionally robust competition must exist at all times for state integrity to be sustained, but this is questionable given that post-war Western Europe experienced numerous party crises that failed to undermine the integrity of the given state, and Latin America is replete with cases of historically competitive party systems and weak state-building. All of which suggests that political competition is a necessary but insufficient guarantor of Weberian standards.
Legacies, elites, party organisation and competitive strategies
The high point of polyarchic analyses had coincided with the post-war era of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1982) but the benefits to democracy of pluralist political structures had turned out to depend on vocational elite commitments to democratic values and political economic conditions that maintained their popularity. The West European party systems literature has consequently long monitored the corrosion of stable party competitions after the 'Golden Age' of European growth. From Kircheimer's (1966) 'catch all' parties to Panebianco's (1988) 'electoral-professional' parties, Koole's (1994) modern cadre parties, Katz and Mair's (1995) The strategic calculations of these relatively socially and ideologically unanchored 'mass elites' regarding party longevity were necessarily different from those of relatively constrained 'ideological' elites. Two different logics of competition thus emerged in the region over time, logics which were further confronted with the management of performance in government and the electoral response to it.
Where parties were attached to emerging electoral cleavages and social bases through their ideological commitments they developed into relatively 'electoral-professional' parties i.e. historically rooted parties increasingly dependent on political 'professionals'
to develop new strategies of party competition (Panebianco, 1988) . For such parties, seeking to maintain the credibility of their normative identities, programmatic competition was the most sustainable source of party establishment, assuming conducive political economic conditions over time. And as Tavits has shown, those that also invested in organisational strength and membership, other things being equal, fared better than their ideological matches in like cases (Tavits, 2012) .
Even more than their kin in Western Europe, however, these Central European electoralprofessional parties confronted daunting political-economic challenges in government.
Party state capture occurred when a pillar of this competition, on the social democratic left in both instances, was knocked out by deepening fiscal constraints on credible economic competition. Given the region's dominant socio-economic electoral cleavage the collapse of the left ushered in a political battle for the support of lower income voters but in conditions where the impossibility of sustaining redistributive programmes had been proven. Party state capture duly followed from conspiracy-rich nationalist appeals that required the 'renewal' of the state and the closing down of democratic competitions now argued to have failed 'the people'.
Mass elite parties, in the meantime, carried the extreme elite flexibility we associate with 'business-firm' parties. Hopkin and Paolucci had observed that new parties in the postauthoritarian democracies of Greece, Portugal and Spain had faced strong pressures towards the 'electoral-professionalism' of the established parties of Western Europe but without the inherited constraints on pushing that model to its logical conclusion.
Consequently they could more readily become parties, in Down's phrase, 'that might formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to formulate policies' (Downs, 1957, p. 28) . Thus "the [business-firm] party, instead of being a voluntary organisation with essentially social objectives, becomes a kind of 'business firm', in which the public goods produced are incidental to the real objectives of those leading it; in Olson's terminology, policy is a 'by-product'" (Hopkin and Paolucci, 1999, pp. 310-312 (Ganev, 2001 ). Shefter concluded that 'internally created parties', i.e. those emerging from within state institutions, will consider patronage a viable option as a key survival strategy (Shefter, 1994) . Given that the majority of Central European parties emerged and still emerge from within existing parliamentary parties we should not be surprised that only when they were led by committed and constrained democratic elites were there efforts to build Weberian states. Thus where Leviathan argued that it was robustness of competition that counted, I would contend that it was the predominance of vocational elites that determined a democratic mode of institution-building. The result is the same division of cases as Leviathan's but on a different basis and with different expectations. It is also worth noting how un-amenable the corrupt cluster is to explanation through different variables often cited as relevant in accounting for party system, and hence party-state, dynamics, i.e. in creating barriers to entry. In practice, variation in electoral systems or the effective number of parties is too high across both clusters to account for the patterning that we see. The following two critical case studies, the first of the pressures on 'electoral professional' competition in Poland and the second on the evolution of brokerage parties in the Czech Republic, are offered to test this theory -with both cases providing confirmation.
Ideological competitions, government performance and party-state capture: Poland
As the country with the strongest and most diverse legacy of dissent: an established dissident elite rooted in large sections of society, a committed generation of reformist former communists and a society distinguished by a vibrant and uniquely independent Catholic Church, Polish experience illustrates the pressures facing even the most well founded party systems of the region: those engaged in relatively 'electoral professional' modes of programmatic competition. Like their Western counterparts, these party systems had to address the pressing public policy problems of the day to maintain their credibility (Kitschelt, 2010, pp. 669-670 (Kitschelt, 1994) . If this retention of leftist economic space becomes impossible, however, i.e. if social democratic parties in government lose all serious traction on social justice issues in economic terms, then this logically forces the collapse of their normative project and the credibility of the party as such. It diminishes the space for economic representation and opens up the risk of antisystem players increasing their vote among lower income voters. This scenario is exactly played out in the Polish, but also, notably, in the Hungarian case.
The Polish ex-communist social democratic left had risen on claims to reformism, proEuropeanism and its ability to mitigate the worst social costs of transition.
Programmatically constrained by the structural requirements of transition, the social Democrats adopted a stance of social-liberal technocracy only for them to collapse when the established post-communist-and already comparatively minimal welfare bargain became untenable and could not be credibly reengineered within the terms of adopted emerging market economic orthodoxies. Given a regime divide of notable historical potency Polish Social Democrats were constrained to not simply start out as marketsupporting but to pivot rightwards in search of higher growth over time, only for this to mean that when growth proved insufficient the party was effectively forced to exit the leftist economic space. As an ex-communist party the Polish Social Democrats would have risked accusations of ideological recidivism had they dared pivot economically leftwards, an anyway unappealing move given no credible competitors on that flank.
In practice high growth rates were not high enough to maintain credible welfare Western Europe have increasingly depended. As the region-wide tax competition deepened, spurred on by the EU's crackdown on subsidies, not only did Poland's liberal left lose its margin for any credible economic policy in social justice terms, but over time they had also steadily lost the institutional requirements for more coordinated economic solutions, as union density fell and unions were estranged by radically liberal labour market policies (Ost, 2005) .
The denouement in democratic system stability came with the Social Democrats'
Hausner plan which proposed cutting public administration and already minimalist social As the Polish case illustrates, the loss of the left's normative credibility is particularly severe when the failures to manage welfare bargaining are apparently endogenous to economic management. But the consequences for the evolution of the state are potentially greater because the collapse of effective economic representation by the left in Poland but also in Hungary necessarily limited the credible space of economic competition and encouraged competing political elites to abandon 'mainstream' political-economic discourses (Ost, 2005) . In these circumstances those political players not constrained by value commitments and seeking to gain the newly de-aligned lower income vote were highly likely to choose re-politicisation of the state as a powerful alternative source of party longevity. Constituency-building through programmatic competition was no longer credible in economic terms and 'brokerage' style corruption was riskier in these more consolidated systems.
If we extend this account of the supply-side vulnerabilities of our more programmatic electoral systems we can see that in Lithuania the Social Democrat's eventual shift to neo-liberal economic policies appeared more determined by external shocks than endogenous party strategy. And here the response to the Russian economic crisis and EU Constituted out of communist 'grey-zone' mass elites the ODS claimed belief in the impersonal power of the market and seized the technocratic high ground by insisting that it alone understood how to institutionalise a market system. The party thus co-opted the discursively 'scientific' mode of the old system, albeit now in Hayekian terms, so that the economy and not democratic institution-building were supposed to be the engine from which all social transformation, including democratisation, would follow. But while even a quick review of the ODS's actual economic policies would reveal a highly pragmatic rather than neo-liberal approach to market-making, Klaus held firm to party control of the state and its non-regulation. As a rent-seeking mass elite party, therefore, the ODS was consistent in its ideological inconsistencies. From the early 1990s to the time of writing the ODS has justified the failure to professionalize the civil service as an anti-state principle having undermined the one potentially serious reform attempt made by the Social Democrats.
By the end of the Klaus coalition governments of the early 1990s, which ended in 1997 amidst major bank collapses and party finance scandals involving the right wing coalition members and Social Democrats, the ODS had lost its credibility as a party able to offer growth without pain and the ministries had clearly developed as political fiefdoms. 
Conclusions
Where has the EU been in all this? The EU's leverage is necessarily limited in cases of party state capture rooted in domestic fiscal constraints and the collapse of economic competition. In a region dominated by a growth model in which consumption and dependence on foreign capital has been prioritised over increases in employment and innovation even the strongest party systems in these open economies are exceptionally vulnerable. Long before the European financial crisis the deepening of the region's fiscal constraints had encouraged coping-mechanisms ranging from the proliferation of shortterm employment contracts to the replacement of public welfare by personal debt;
strategies that precluded the output-legitimacy so important in embedding the values of post-war Western European democracies (see also Epstein and Jacoby, this volume).
The EU's leverage in the cases of corporate state capture rooted in brokerage party systems is equally weak, why? Because, as Mungiu has pointed out, where public goods are distributed on a particularistic basis that mirrors the distribution of economic power within these societies, any anti-corruption strategies that these elites care to take on are typically adopted and implemented in cooperation 'with the very predators who control the government and, in some cases, the anticorruption instruments themselves' (Mungiu, 2006, p. 87) . In this light the chronically high rates of voter volatility in these casesbetween 20-60 per cent in each election between 1990 and 2010, where West European party system are hitting a 'spike' if volatility exceeds 20 per cent (Dassonneville and Hooghe, 2011, pp. 33-34) -is unsurprising, as is the steady rise in the effective number of parties at both the electoral and parliamentary levels through the same period, encouraging a vicious circle of non-consolidation (Tavits, 2005) . The only solution to such serious instability is an effective war on particularism and this battle is necessarily domestic and civil, as Dimitrova and Buzogány's article in this volume illustrates so well.
Can the EU at least do something to alter these domestic balances of power? The EU already mitigates the imbalances of public investment and development through its structural, cohesion and agricultural subsidies. And although these are targeted for abuse within the brokerage party systems it would surely have been worse for these countries to have opened to the globalised world economy without EU membership and the massive subsidies and latterly, bank bailouts that have come with it. But the more pressing issue raised by the current Eurozone crisis is whether the EU will seek to re-engineer the model of European capitalism away from the dominant neo-liberalism in which the rising profit-new, into unlooked for political storms. Thus the EU has promoted an increasingly liberal capitalist game only to find itself in an unprecedented crisis as to how to reinforce its legitimacy. In the meantime Central Europe has developed party systems increasingly polarised between economically highly liberal right-wing parties who speak to the socioeconomic 'winners' and, absent credibly programmatic social democrats, socially and politically illiberal parties seeking to attract 'the losers'. And half of the new member states are characterised by brokerage parties that instrumentalise the effective mainstream space of ideological competition to primarily private ends. Consequently we should not expect stable party-state relations in this region any time soon.
